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to activate the "gotcha" provisions of section 357 (c). On the contrary, by
allowing an incorporator to transfer rather than liquidate payables, the
Bongiovanni court has upheld the purpose of section 351-to permit tax-free
incorporations.
EDWARD 0.

SAVnTZ

JUVENILE COURT: DUE PROCESS, DOUBLE JEOPARDY,
AND THE FLORIDA WAIVER PROCEDURES
The history of American freedom is, in no small measure, the history
of procedure.,
The independent juvenile court system is the modern answer to the ancient
problem of disposition of juveniles accused of criminal violations. 2 Although
the doctrine of parens patriae traditionally justified equity jurisdiction over
neglected or dependent children,3 common law criminal tribunals dealt with
offenders over seven years of age as adults, and imprisoned or hanged juvenile
law violators under sentence of law. 4 The harshness of this style of prosecution,
together with increased acceptance of concepts of rehabilitative treatment,5
led reformers to include the criminally delinquent child within the informal
processes of the juvenile courts.
The transition from criminal prosecution of juvenile offenders to treatment within the juvenile court system, however, has never been completed. In
Florida, for example, tension and overlap between the juvenile and criminal
systems exist through statutory provisions permitting waiver of jurisdiction
over felony offenders by the juvenile courts and the transfer of juveniles
charged with serious felonies to criminal authorities by grand jury indictment.7

1. Malinski v. New York, 324 U.S. 401, 414 (1945) (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
2. See generally Pound, The Juvenile Court and the Law, 10 CRIME & DELIN. 490, 493
(1964).
3. Under this doctrine the state has jurisdiction as the ultimate protector of any of its
citizens found to be in need. See Nicholas, History, Philosophy, and Procedures of Juvenile
Courts, I J. FAMILY L. 151, 152-53 (1961).
4. "So it was that a twelve-year-old boy named James Guild was tried ....
A jury found
him guilty of murder, and he was sentenced to death by hanging....
It was all very Constitutional." In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 80 (1967) (Harlan, J., dissenting). See also Mack, The
Juvenile Court, 23 HARV. L. REv. 104 (1909).
5. See PRESIDENT'S COMM'N ON LAW ENFORCEMENT AND ADMINIsTRATION OF JUSTICE, The
Administration of Juvenile Justice, in JUVENILE DELINQUENCY AND YOUTH CRIME 1-9 (1967),
reprinted in SOCIETY, DELINQUENCY AND DELINQUENT BEHAVIOR 345, 347 (Voss ed. 1970) [hereinafter cited as PRESIDENT'S COMM'N].

6. Fla. Laws 1973, ch. 231, §8, amending FLA. STAT. §39.02(6)(a); FLA. R. Juv. P. §8.100(c).
7. Fla. Laws 1973, ch. 231, §3, amending FLA. STAT. §39.02(6)(c).
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Moreover, the informal adjudication system of the juvenile court has recently been the subject of intense criticism due to failure of its rehabilitative
techniques8 and the inequalities of its summary procedures. 9 The Supreme
Court has attempted to rectify procedural inequities of the juvenile system by
applying procedural safeguards through the due process clause, 10 while seeking
to retain the benefits of the informal, non-prosecutorial system. Application of
due process has resulted in the inclusion of certain criminal standards into
the adjudicatory phase of the juvenile court process.'1 One standard not yet
specifically required by Supreme Court decision is the fifth amendment protection from double jeopardy' 2 This commentary will attempt to show that

application of double jeopardy to the juvenile adjudication process can benefit
the juvenile system by more fully implementing concepts of fundamental fairness to the juvenile accused and by removing much of the tension and confusion between juvenile and criminal authorities regarding adjudication and
disposition of juveniles accused of felony violations.
DUE PRocass: THE RELEVANT TEsT

Criminal procedural safeguards were most fully extended to juvenile court

proceedings in the Supreme Court decision of In re Gault.13 Stating that
"neither the Fourteenth Amendment nor the Bill of Rights is for adults
alone,"' 4 the Gault majority applied certain safeguards to the adjudicatory
phase of delinquency proceedings by holding that the juvenile court process

8. Critics have stressed the juvenile court system's practical failure to implement its
rehabilitative theory, as well as a tendency toward use of the juvenile process for condemnation, deterrence, and incapacitation rather than for rehabilitation. See PRESmENT'S COMM'N,
supra note 5, at 355-57. Despite its criticisms, however, the Commission recognized that return to full criminal treatment for juvenile offenders was not a valid alternative. Id.
9. See, e.g., In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967); Kent v. United States, 383 US. 544 (1966).
See also Handier, The Juvenile Court and the Adversary System: Problems of Function and
Form, 1965 Wis. L. REv. 7 (1965).
10. See Neigher, The Gault Decision: Due Process and the Juvenile Courts, 31 FED. PROB.
8 (1967). Rather than revert to criminal prosecution, the due process applications seeks to
"insure that the juvenile court will operate in an atmosphere which is orderly enough to
impress the juvenile with the gravity of the situation . . . and at the same time informal
enough to permit the benefits of the juvenile system to operate." In re Terry, 438 Pa. 339,
347, 265 A.2d 350, 354 (1970).
11. Florida juvenile proceedings consist of four distinct hearing phases: detention (concerning pre-adjudication custody); waiver (concerning possible transfer to criminal jurisdic-

tion); adjudication (concerning proof of delinquency); and disposition (concerning commitment). FLA. R. Juv. P. §8.110(a)-(d).
12. This safeguard seeks to protect an individual from double punishment for a single
offense, Ex parte Lange, 85 U.S. (18 Wall.) 163, 173 (1873), and from the rigors of excessive prosecution, Green v. United States, 355 U.S. 184 (1957).
13. 387 U.S. 1 (1967). The Gault decision was foreshadowed by Kent v. United States,
383 U.S. 541 (1966), which relied on due process considerations in interpreting a Washington,
D.C. statute to require a hearing prior to a juvenile judge's waiver decision.
14. 387 U.S. at 13.
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must meet the standards of due process.15 In reaching its decision the Court
refused to apply criminal standards in toto, instead weighing the nature and
purpose of each protection against possible detrimental effects to the orderly
functioning of the juvenile system. 16 Though the Gault Court specifically
limited its holding to particular phases of the adjudicatory process, 1 7 the decision was heralded as the first step toward complete application of criminal
procedures to the juvenile court system.' 8 The Court, however, failed to meet
the expectations following Gault by refusing in McKeiver v. Pennsylvania9 to
apply the right to trial by jury to juvenile adjudication proceedings.
The McKeiver court interpreted Gault as emphasizing the validity of the
adjudicatory factfinding process, 20 and found the jury not to be a "necessary
2
component of accurate factfinding. '" 21 The Court further expressed fear that: 2
[T]he jury trial ... will remake the juvenile proceeding into a fully adversary process and will put an effective end to what has been the idealistic prospect of an intimate, informal protective proceeding.
Under the due process standard outlined by McKeiver, determination of the
applicability of a procedural safeguard to the juvenile process must take into
consideration the fundamental nature of the protection, 23 the potential harm
to the operation of the juvenile court, 2 4 and the effect of the protection on
25
the accuracy of the juvenile factfinding process.
The double jeopardy safeguard may be applied to the juvenile court system under the tests enunciated in McKeiver.26 The right to protection from
successive prosecutions is fundamental, 2 and though some reduction in flex-

15. Id. at 30-31. The Gault decision specifically applied right to counsel, right to confrontation and cross-examination, right to notice of charges, and the privilege against selfincrimination.
16. Id. at 31-59.
17. Id. at 13.
18. See, e.g., George, Juvenile Delinquency Proceedings: The Due Process Model, 40
U. COLO. L. REv. 315 (1968); Milton, Post-Gault, A New Prospectus for the Juvenile Court,
16 N.Y.L.F. 57 (1970); cf. Neigher, supra note 10.

19. 403 U.S. 528 (1971).
20.

Id. at 543. See also Comment, ConstitutionalLaw: The Jury and the Juvenile Court,

24 U. FLA. L. REV. 385 (1972).
21. 403 U.S. at 543.
22. Id. at 548. The McKeiver Court also was persuaded by the fact that few states apply
jury trials to juvenile proceedings.
23. Id. at 540-41.
24. Id. at 545.
25. Id. at 543.
26. Though double jeopardy protection appears to meet all criteria enunciated in
McKeiver, it has also been argued that the McKeiver plurality's emphasis on the juvenile
court factfinding process was an overly narrow construction of Gault, and that the applicable standard should be a balance between the benefit of a particular safeguard and
potential disruption of juvenile court functions through its application. See Rudstein,
Double Jeopardy in Juvenile Proceedings,14 WM. & MARY L. PEv. 266 (1972).
27. Double jeopardy protection was held applicable to state criminal prosecutions as a
fundamental right in Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784, 794 (1969).
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ibility might result from applying double jeopardy to the adjudicatory process,
the juvenile system would not be interrupted as it would by requirement of a

jury trial.28 Further, application of double jeopardy would enhance the validall parties to litigate relevant factual
ity of the factfinding process by forcing
29
issues in a single juvenile hearing.
Application of the double jeopardy safeguard to the Florida juvenile system would also have a significant effect on provisions concerning transfer of
youthful offenders to criminal court jurisdiction.3 0 To gauge this effect it is

necessary to view the historical development of these procedures and their
present operation.
DEVELOPMENT OF FLORIDA TRANSFER PRovisIoNs

Florida's first juvenile court system was instituted in 1911,31 eleven years
after introduction of the juvenile court concept in the United States. 2 Though
Florida juvenile courts were given jurisdiction over many phases of delinquency,3 3 state constitutional provisions vesting criminal jurisdiction in
other courts 34 precluded juvenile treatment for a great number of youthful

offenders.
The jurisdictional problem was emphasized by the Supreme Court of Florida in Ex parte Kitts2 5 There, a sixteen-year-old boy, charged before a justice
of the peace with a criminal offense, was transferred to the custody of juvenile

authorities without prior criminal conviction. Upholding the boy's demand
for habeas corpus relief, the supreme court held that adjudication of guilt

through criminal prosecution was a necessary prerequisite to juvenile court

36
treatment where a criminal offense was the sole basis for delinquent status.

28. The McKeiver plurality feared the possibilities of delay, formality, and the clamor
of a public trial inherent in trial by jury. 403 U.S. at 550. These possibilities could not be
engendered by application of double jeopardy, which would affect only the number of
juvenile court proceedings that could be brought against an individual. See Rudstein, supra
note 26, at 282.
29. See Rudstein, supra note 26, at 305.
30. Fla. Laws 1973, ch. 231, §3, amending FLA. STAT. §39.02(6)(a-c) (1971); FLA. R. Juv. P.
§8.100(c).
31. Fla. Laws 1911, ch. 6216, at 181. This provision was held constitutional under the
state's general police power. Board of Comm'rs v. Savage, 63 Fla. 337, 58 So. 835 (1912). Under
this statute, county judges were authorized to act as judges of the juvenile court. Subsequently a 1914 state constitutional amendment empowered the Florida Legislature to create
separate juvenile court systems. FLA. CoNsr. art. V, §.
32. The first juvenile court was founded in Chicago, Illinois. See Pound, supra note 2,
at 493.
33. Fla. Laws 1911, ch. 6216, §1, at 181. Juvenile jurisdiction extended to any child "who
is a persistant truant from school, or who associates with criminals, or reputed criminals,
or vicious or immoral persons, or who is growing up in idleness or crime, or who frequents,
visits, or is found in any disorderly house, bawdy house, or house of ill fame, or any house
or place where spirituous liquors... are sold." Id. at 132.
34. FA. CONST. art. V, §§6-8.
35. 109 Fla. 202, 147 So. 573 (1933).
36. Id. at 203-04, 147 So. at 574.
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The court further stressed that a system not providing for trial prior to
juvenile adjudication of delinquency would be of dubious constitutionality37
This interpretation of the Florida juvenile system gave law enforcement
officers and committing magistrates a choice of forums for disposition of
juvenile offenders, as many youths who could be criminally prosecuted could
also be committed to juvenile custody as a result of separate actions. 31 Further,
under the system created by the Florida statutes and the Kitts decision, a
criminal court judge had the discretion either to sentence a convicted juvenile
to the state prison or to commit him to juvenile authorities. 39 Should the
judge choose to remand the child to juvenile custody he retained the jurisdiction to resentence any juvenile offender later found to be "incorrigible, or
incapable of reformation, or dangerous to the welfare of the community."40
Subsequent statutes creating county juvenile courts narrowed judicial discretion as to commitment by providing for mandatory transfer of convicted
juveniles to juvenile court authorities. 41 Nevertheless, a major statutory exception to mandatory transfer exempted juveniles accused of certain serious
felonies.4 2 A state court interpreting this exception justified it by stating:4 3
W\e cannot attribute to the Legislature the intent to place that class of
dangerous, though youthful criminals . . . beyond the reach of the

criminal courts of this state and to deprive the criminal courts of
jurisdiction to . . . punish such offenders under the terms of our crim-

inal statutes.
The result of these early juvenile statutes and interpretations given them
by Florida courts was that many youthful criminal offenders were subjected
to public criminal trials 44 and eventually committed to adult prisons.4 5 A

37. Id.
38. See Waybright, A Proposed Juvenile Court Act for Florida, 4 U. FLA. L. REv. 16,
20 (1951).
39. Fla. Laws 1911, ch. 6216, §9, at 186. See also Ex parte Kitts, 109 Fla. 202, 205, 147 So.
573, 575 (1933).
40. Fla. Laws 1911, ch. 6216, §9, at 186. By failing to define specifically the type of
conduct that could subject a juvenile to resentencing, the statute vested broad discretion in
the trial judge to construe the general public welfare.
41. See, e.g., Fla. Laws 1921, ch. 8663, at 111, establishing a juvenile court for Dade
County. This statute was interpreted as precluding a municipal court judge from imposing
a prison sentence on a juvenile after adjudication of guilt. State ex rel. Johnson v. Quigg,
83 Fla. 1, 90 So. 695 (1922).
42. Fla. Laws 1911, ch. 6216, §10 at 186. "The provisions (relating to commitment) shall
not apply to children accused or guilty of the crimes of rape, murder, manslaughter, robbery,
arson, burglary, or the attempt to commit any of these crimes."
43. State ex rel. Interlandi v. Petteway, 114 Fla. 850, 854, 155 So. 319, 320 (1934). The
Petteway court held, however, that this provision did not remove a trial judge's discretion to
commit a juvenile convicted of one of the exempted crimes to juvenile custody after a
criminal trial. Id.
44. The fact of public criminal trials was itself a main focus of attack by juvenile court
reformers. See, e.g., In re Santillanes, 47 N.M. 140, 138 P.2d 503 (1943).
45. Statistics for the year 1949 alone showed 72 children between the ages of eight and
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1950 amendment to the Florida constitution 4" removed the jurisdictional
stumbling block, however, by allowing the state legislature to vest exclusive,
original jurisdiction over criminal cases involving juveniles in the juvenile
47
court system. This amendment led to passage of Florida's Juvenile Court Act,
which applied the informal equity procedures of the existing juvenile courts
to all phases of delinquency.
Although the Juvenile Court Act eliminated mandatory criminal trials for
youthful offenders, it also rejected criminal procedural safeguards by labelling
its proceedings civil in nature4s and operating under the parens patriae
rationale. 49 Further, despite its innovative provisions, the Act did not terminate the possibility of criminal prosecution of juveniles. Rather, through provisions relating to permissive 50 and mandatory-' waiver of juvenile court jurisdiction over youths charged with certain felony offenses, it retained the tension
between the two court systems and the possibility of multiple adjudications
of guilt.
Pursuant to present waiver provisions a juvenile judge may waive jurisdiction over any child fourteen years of age or older whose offense constitutes a
violation of Florida law. 52 Furthermore, the criminal courts automatically assume jurisdiction upon demand by the accused and his guardian,53 or upon
grand jury indictment charging an offense punishable by death or life imprisonment.5 4

seventeen sentenced to the Florida State Prison at Raiford. This figure does not include
those juveniles imprisoned in various county jails. Waybright, supra note 38, at 23.
46. FLA. CONST. art. V, §12.
47. FLA. STAT. §§39.01-20 (1971), as amended by Fla. Laws 1973, ch. 231, §§1-23.
48. See Waybright, supra note 38, at 25-26.
49. "[N]ot with the awe-inspiring and frigid methods of a criminal court, but informally
and intimately, like a wise and gentle elder brother." State v. Scholl, 167 Wis. 504, 509, 167
N.W. 830, 831 (1918). See Waybright, supra note 88, at 19. The few procedural rights granted
in juvenile proceedings were usually based on the vested rights of the parents of the juvenile. See, e.g., Noeling v. State, 87 So. 2d 593 (Fla. 1956).
50. Fla. Laws 1951, ch. 26,880, §6, at 987, as amended, Fla. Laws 1973, ch. 231, §13, to
be codified as FLA. STAT. §39.02(6)(a).
51. Fla. Laws 1951, ch. 26,880, §6, at 987. This provision, which required a juvenile
judge to waive jurisdiction over children who would be charged with certain felonies in
criminal courts, was amended in 1967 to require grand jury indictment before termination
of juvenile court jurisdiction. See Fla. Laws 1967, ch. 71, §1, at 137.
52. Fla. Laws 1973, ch. 231, §3, amending FLA. STAT. §39.02(6)(a). Formerly, this provision restricted waiver to offenses that would constitute felony violations. Fla. Laws 1967,
ch. 71, §1, at 137. Under the amended provisions, therefore, it appears that the juvenile
courts may waive jurisdiction over misdemeanor offenses. But see FLA. R. JuV. P. 8.100(c)
(providing waiver only in felony situations).
53. Fla. Laws 1973, ch. 231, §8, amending FLA. STAT. §39.02(6)(b). A recent Florida decision noted that any juvenile seeking the full protections of criminal safeguards could demand transfer to the criminal courts. In re V.D., 245 So. 2d 273 (4th D.CA. Fla. 1971).
However, any system requiring an accused to forego the benefits of juvenile status in order
to obtain due process rights might be held unconstitutional. Cf. Nieves v. United States,
280 F. Supp. 994 (S.D.N.Y. 1968). Compare In re A.J., 241 So. 2d 439 (3d D.CA. Fla. 1970),
with V.D.B. v. State, 261 So. 2d 857 (1st D.CA. Fla.), aff'd, 210 So. 2d 6 (Fla. 1972).
54. Fla. Laws 1973, ch. 231, §3, amending FLA. STAT. §39.02(6)(e). This provision is not
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The waiver decision of the juvenile judge is based on a determination of
the reasonable prospects of rehabilitating the child through the juvenile system prior to his reaching the age of majority, 55 and results from consideration
of the interests of the public as well as the accused. 56 Neither a state attorney
nor a grand jury can adequately assess the potential for rehabilitation through
juvenile treatment, and therefore the decision to transfer through indictment
lacks the range of relevant information available to the juvenile judge. Since
the public interest is best served by an informed decision as to rehabilitation
potential, the provision requiring transfer upon indictment does not further
the general welfare and may also interfere with the proper function of the
juvenile court.
The indictment provision, analogous to the exemption of serious felonies
57
from mandatory juvenile commitment contained in the pre-1950 statutes,
has been criticized as a reversion to common law retributive justice, inconsistent with the rehabilitative model of the juvenile system.58 This criticism
seems to be sustained by the fact that grand jury indictment is an assumption
that a juvenile guilty of a serious offense is, because of his crime alone, not
capable of rehabilitation through the juvenile system.5 9 A more informed decision, weighing the public interest on the basis of all relevant factors, can be
made by the juvenile judge through the waiver process and therefore the

included within the Florida Rules of Juvenile Procedure, promulgated by the Florida supreme court. Since these rules require all juvenile court delinquency petitions to be filed
by the state attorney there may be less recourse to transfer through indictment in the future.
Nevertheless, the juvenile procedure rules supersede only those statutory provisions that are
in conflict, and the indictment provision was reenacted in 1973 by the Florida Legislature and
is still in force. See In re Transition Rule 11, 270 So. 2d 715 (Fla. 1972).
55. Fla. Laws 1973, ch. 231, §15, amending FLA. STAT. §39.09(2)(c). The statute provides
for studies, prepared by the Division of Youth Services, to be submitted to the juvenile
judge prior to his decision. Fla. Laws 1973, ch. 231, §15, amending FLA. STAT. §39.09(2)(e).
Further, it states that factors such as the nature of the offense, past delinquency records,
and the child's past response to treatment efforts shall be considered in determining the
prospects for rehabilitation. Id., amending FLA. STAT. §39.09(2)(e). The nature of the offense,
while not determinative, has been a prime consideration in past waiver decisions. See, e.g.,
J.E.M. v. State, 217 So. 2d 135 (3d D.C.A. Fla. 1968) (rape, robbery, kidnapping); B.P.W. v.
State, 214 So. 2d 365 (3d D.C.A. Fla. 1968) (murder). Jurisdiction has been waived, however,
in cases involving less serious offenses. See, e.g., State v. Bryant, 276 So. 2d 184 (Ist D.C.A.
Fla. 1973) (lewd and lascivious behavior).
56. Prior to the 1973 amendment, §39.02(6)(a) specifically stated that a waiver decision
was to result from consideration of the public interest. Fla. Laws 1967, ch. 71, §1 at 137. By
deleting this phrase, and establishing reasonable possibility of rehabilitation through the
juvenile system as the main criterion for waiver, the amended statute appears to recognize
that both the public interest and that of the accused are served by juvenile court handling
wherever there is a reasonable possibility of rehabilitation. See Fla. Laws 1973, ch. 231, §§3,
15, amending FLA. STAT. §§39.02(6)(a), .09(2)(c).
57. Fla. Laws 1911, ch. 6216, §10, at 186. See text accompanying notes 41-43 supra.
58. See Note, Rights and Rehabilitation in the Juvenile Courts, 67 COLUM. L. Rzv. 281,
312 (1967).
59. "[T]he ability of the juvenile courts to aid a youth cannot properly be made a function of the nature of his offense." Id.
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statutory requirement of transfer to criminal court through indictment should
be repealed.
Transfer through indictment is not the only factor obstructing smooth
operation of the juvenile court regarding juveniles accused of felony violations. The lack of procedural safeguards against successive adjudications of
guilt, in addition to its immediate negative effects on the accused, may further
interfere with the proper functioning of the juvenile court as an independent
body.
DouBLE JEOPARDY

AND THE WAIVER PROCESS

Florida's juvenile court provisions do not specify the point at which the

hearing and decision concerning waiver of jurisdiction must take place,6 0 nor
are time limitations imposed on a state attorney's right to terminate juvenile
court jurisdiction through indictment.61 Where the waiver or indictment decisions are made subsequent to adjudication of delinquency, the fundamental
fairness of subsequent criminal prosecution must be closely scrutinized.
The leading Florida decision concerning double jeopardy and the juvenile
process is State v. R.E.F.,6 2 decided after McKeiver v. Pennsylvania.6s In R.E.F.
a juvenile was indicted by a grand jury for rape six days subsequent to his
adjudication as a delinquent based on the same act. The district court of appeal reversed a trial judge's dismissal of the indictment on double jeopardy
grounds, finding that the double proceedings did not violate the standard of
fundamental fairness. 64 Holding that jeopardy did not attach to an adjudicatory hearing because of the civil nature of the process, 65 the R.E.F. court
established a test for consideration of fundamental fairness by stating: 66

60. Fla. Laws 1973, ch. 231, §15, amending FLA. STAT. §39.09(2) 1971. While this provision
outlines the routine procedure, in which a motion for waiver hearing is made before the
petition is heard on the merits, it does not specifically preclude motion for waiver, or
waiver action by a juvenile judge, after adjudication of delinquency.
61. Fla. Laws 1973, ch. 231, §, amending FLA. STAT. §39.02(6)(c). This provision also

establishes routine time guidelines, but fails to preclude grand jury indictment and consequent criminal court jurisdiction after expiration of the time periods provided.
62. 251 So. 2d 672 (1st D.CA. Fla. 1971), aff'd, 265 So. 2d 701 (Fla. 1972).
63. 403 U.S. 528 (1971). See text accompanying notes 19-25 supra.
64. 251 So. 2d. at 680.
65. Id. at 675. This holding was rejected by a federal district court in a petition by the
R.E.F. defendant for habeas corpus relief. The court held: "When a person is put before a
juvenile court, and that court is competent to act, and has the authority to threaten this
person with loss of liberty, jeopardy attaches to the proceeding." Fain v. Duff, 364 F. Supp.
1192, 1196 (M.D. Fla. 1973), aff'd, 488 F.2d 218 (5th Cir. 1973). Rather than applying the
due process balance, the federal district court strictly applied the fifth amendment protection,
equating the juvenile court with the municipal court considered in Waller v. Florida, 397
US. 387 (1970). The holding lacked any reference to the civil label stressed in the Florida
state court opinion.
66. 251 So. 2d 672, 680 (1st D.C.A. Fla. 1971).
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The time has long since passed when the courts of our country should
start striking a balance between what is fundamentally fair for a juvenile guilty of committing a criminal act, as compared to what is fundamentally fair for the juvenile's victims, their families, and society's right
to be free from lawless acts.
Considering the actions of the accused within this framework, the court held
67
that due process did not preclude the subsequent criminal prosecution.
The test developed by the R.E.F. court to assess fundamental fairness of
prosecution following juvenile adjudication has a crucial weakness: by balancing the rights of a "guilty" juvenile and a victim, the test assumes the guilt
of the accused prior to any criminal trial. Since Gault, the juvenile adjudicatory process has taken on many procedural qualities of the criminal process.
The accused must be proved guilty of a delinquent act beyond a reasonable
doubt,68 afforded the right to counsel,6 9 and adjudged on the basis of a specific
charge,70 in a hearing presided over by a judicial officer.7 1 In fact, as a recent
Florida decision noted, the adjudicatory process "partakes of the nature of a
criminal proceeding rather than a proceeding in which the state is parens
patriae." 72 However, as the R.E.F. court held in its refusal to apply the double
jeopardy standard strictly, the juvenile adjudication process is not a criminal
proceeding.73 This fact is codified in the Florida Juvenile Court Act, which
74
states:
An adjudication by a juvenile court that a child is dependent or delinquent shall not be deemed a conviction, nor shall the child be
deemed to have been found guilty . . . by reason of that adjudication ....
Thus, application of the R.E.F. balancing test to an accused whose only adjudication has been through the juvenile system would itself be fundamentally
unfair, as the accused would receive the presumption and stigma of criminal
guilt, without being afforded the jeopardy protection available through the
criminal process.
The R.E.F. decision, then, failed to recognize the inherent unfairness of
successive accusatory proceedings. The requirement of fairness, along with the
possibilities of excessive strain and expense engendered by multiple accusa-

67. Id. The R.E.F. court also feared a conspiracy between the juvenile court and the
accused to enter adjudication of delinquency over the objection of the state. Id. This fear
has been rendered moot by the new requirement that delinquency petitions be initiated by
the state attorney. FLA. R. Juv. P. §8.060(1). See note 54 supra.
68. State v. V.D.B., 270 So. 2d 6 (Fla. 1972).
69. In re V.D., 245 So. 2d 273 (4th D.C.A. Fla. 1971).
70. D.M.M. v. State, 275 So. 2d 308 (2d D.C.A. Fla. 1973).
71. K.M. v. State, 277 So. 2d 577 (3d D.C.A. Fla. 1973).
72. Id. See also FLA. R. Juv. P. §8.180, which applies nonconflicting Florida criminal
procedural rules to proceedings involving delinquent children.
73. State v. R.E.F., 251 So. 2d 672, 679 (Ist D.C.A. Fla. 1971).
74. FLA. STAT. §39.10(3) (1971).
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tions, makes the double jeopardy safeguard crucial to the juvenile system's
proper operation from the standpoint of the accused.
The negative effects of successive proceedings may also seriously interfere
with many of the beneficial aspects of the juvenile process itself. The primary
danger is that the possibility of prosecution subsequent to juvenile court adjudication will create a lack of respect for the juvenile court process. 7 5 Conscientious defense counsel may be unwilling to present all facts favorable to
their clients at the adjudicatory hearing for fear of exposing weaknesses to
future prosecutors.76 Likewise, the state may well seek to accomplish adjudication with as little presentation of evidence as possible, looking forward to the
possibility of future waiver of juvenile jurisdiction or grand jury indictment.
Given the insecurity as to their finality, juvenile proceedings involving felonies
may eventually become little more than preliminary hearings. Consequently,
the defendant himself must balance the benefits of the juvenile system against
the effect of his adjudication upon a future prosecution whenever the nature
of his act or his age make waiver or indictment a possibility.
The possible loss of respect for the juvenile process directly contradicts
the desired function of the juvenile court as an independent body seeking to
apply rehabilitative techniques. The option of the juvenile court judge to
waive jurisdiction over certain individuals serves the salutary function of determining the desirability of juvenile treatment in a specific situation,7 within
the context of the general public interest. Proper functioning of the juvenile
adjudicatory process, as well as fairness to the individual subjected to it, nevertheless require that the waiver determination take place prior to the adjudicatory phase of the juvenile proceedings. To accomplish this, safeguards in the
nature of protection against double jeopardy must be implemented.
RECOMMENDATION

Recently amended provisions of Florida's Juvenile Court Act,78 while outlining procedures that avoid double prosecution in the average case, do not
0
actually protect against the possibility of future double jeopardy situations.7
75. See generally Rudstein, supra note 26. Waiver hearings held prior to the adjudicatory phase of the juvenile process are free of double jeopardy overtones, since the
accused is not subjected to more than one adjudication of his guilt or innocence. See People
v. Brown, 13 Cal. App. 8d 876, 91 Cal. Rptr. 904 (1970), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 835 (1971).
A pre-adjudication waiver hearing is more analogous to a criminal preliminary hearing, as
only probable cause is determined. FLA. R. Juv. P. §8.110(b)(5).
76. Florida statutory provisions, while they protect the juvenile court record from use
in subsequent prosecution, do not protect against use of evidence introduced or testimony
given in a juvenile hearing. See Fla. Laws 1973, ch. 231, §18, amending FiA. STAT. §39.12(6);
cf. N.D. CENT. CODE §27-20-33.2 (Supp. 1973).
77. See PmSmENT's COMM'N, supra note 5.
78. Fla. Laws 1973, ch. 231, §§1-18, amending FLA. STAT. §39.01-.20.
79. See notes 60-61 supra. Though these provisions do not specifically preclude the possibilities of double prosecution, it can be argued that Florida courts should construe them as
restricting waiver or indictment to the pre-adjudicatory stages. Since double proceedings
violate the due process clause as fundamentally unfair-see text accompanying notes 67-75
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Many states, however, have dealt with the possible injustice of prosecution
subsequent to juvenile adjudication through statutory provisions.so Since the
legislative approach is able to effectuate more completely the required protections, it is superior to piecemeal judicial applications of due process standards.
Provisions of the Uniform Juvenile Court Act offer the best procedural safeguards against double jeopardy. 81This Act provides that:
(1) no evidence obtained in or offered8 2in an adjudicatory hearing may
be introduced in a subsequent proceeding;
take place before
(2) a waiver determination by the juvenile court must
3

a petition alleging delinquency is heard on the merits;

(3) no child may be prosecuted for any offense committed before the age
8 4
of eighteen, unless jurisdiction is properly waived by the juvenile court.

No single procedural step can correct the present problems of the juvenile
court system. Nevertheless, by assuring that all possible steps are taken within
the present system to solidify the procedures of the juvenile court it is possible
to protect more fully both the public interest and the individual accused. Inclusion of the protections of the Uniform Juvenile Court Act within the Florida Juvenile Court Rules along with repeal of the transfer through indictment
provision8 5 will greatly reduce harmful overlap between the juvenile and
criminal court systems and improve the present haphazard treatment of juvenile criminal offenders in Florida.
MICHAEL

supra

-

A.

FOGARTY

the amended statutes should be construed in this manner so as to preserve them

from constitutional objection. Cf. Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 382-83 (1971); United
States v. Vuitch, 402 U.S. 62, 70 (1971).
80. Most of these statutes preclude the use of evidence obtained in an adjudicatory
proceeding in any subsequent criminal action. See, e.g., MINN. STAT. §260.211 (1971); N.D.
CENT. CODE §27-20-33.2 (Supp. 1973). Others provide that the accused juvenile may not be
subjected to criminal prosecution except through a valid waiver procedure. E.g., N.D. CENr.
CODE §27-20-34.2 (Supp. 1973); TaX. REV. Civ. STAT. art. 2338-1(j) (Supp. 1973).
81.

This Act has at present been adopted in North Dakota and has served as the model

for several other state juvenile court acts. See N.D. CENT. CODE §§27-20-1 to 59 (Supp. 1973).
See also Note, Uniform Juvenile Court Act, 48 N.D.L. REv. 93 (1971).
82. Uniform Juvenile Court Act §88(B).

83. Id. §34(l)(a).
84. Id. §34(3).
85. Fla. Laws 1973, ch. 231, §3, amending FLA

STAT.
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